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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FEDERAL TRADB CoMMISSION-CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY AuTHORITY To Oru>BR AnmTIONAL CoMPLIANCB REPORTS-Proceeding under section 5 of its organic act,1 the Federal Trade Commission issued an
order requiring defendants to cease and desist from engaging in certain trade
practices. The court of appeals, in its decree affirming the order, directed compliance reports to be filed with the commission within a specified time, reserving
jurisdiction to enter further orders.2 Four years after the compliance reports were
filed, the commission, on its own motion, ordered additional reports to show
continued compliance. Defendants refused to report, challenging the authority
of the commission to issue the order. The district court dismissed suit by the
commission for mandatory injunction and penalties,3 and the court of appeals
affumed.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed.
The commission's order was authorized by the Federal Trade Commission Act
and did not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. United States v. Morton Salt Co., _338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357
(1950).
Historically, the efforts of Congress to endow administrative agencies with
broad powers of investigation have come into collision with (I) the constitutional
barrier of the searches and seizures provision of the Fourth Amendment5 and (2)
the reluctance of courts to acknowledge the statutory grant of power. 6 The principal case, in resolving a doubtful question of statutory power7 in favor of the
Federal Trade Commission, exemplifies the tremendous change in recent years
away from restrictive interpretation. The case also illustrates the disappearance
of many of the earlier constitutional limitations on the power of inquiry. Formerly, it was thought that administrative agencies-like the courts-were restricted in compelling the production of records and reports to instances where there
138 Stat. L. 717 (1914), as amended 52 Stat. L. Ill, 1028 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) §41 et seq.
2 Salt Producers Assn. v. FfC, (7th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 354.
s United States v. Morton Salt Co., (D.C. ID. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 419
4 United States v. Morton Salt Co., (7th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 703.
5 The doctrine that the compulsory production of books and records may be an unconstitutional search and seizure has its roots in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct.
524 (1886), where the statement was unnecessary to the decision of the case. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370 (1906), gave substance to the Boyd dictum. A recent
case, Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494 (1946), in stating,
at 195, that a subpoena duces tecum presents "no question of actual search and seizure,"
established a distinct, and relaxed, standard -of Fourth Amendment protection for corpomte
books and records summoned by orderly process.
6 Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 29 S.Ct. 115 (1908). Cf. Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S.
33, 38 S.Ct. 30 (1917).
7 Specifically, the statutory question was whether the authorization of the commission
to order reports, as granted in §6 (a) and (b), is limited to general economic surveys or
extends to reports of continued compliance with orders issued under §5. The problems of
interpretation are treated in a note in 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 246 (1949).
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was probable cause to believe that a specific violation of law had occurred.8
Recent cases, however, had regarded the agencies to be less like courts and more
like grand juries with respect to investigatory powers.9 This approach was developed in the principal case. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, observed
that, because federal courts are limited in function to the adjudication of cases
and controversies, the judicial subpoena power is exercised only when the evidence sought is relevant to issues in litigation. Administrative agencies in the
discharge of accusatory duties are freed from this judicial limitation and may
apparently summon evidence on a mere suspicion that the law is being violated.
In fact, the emphasis has shifted from the strict requirement of probable cause
to believe a violation of law has occurred to the less rigorous standard of overall
reasonableness in the disclosure desired by the agency. 10 It is submitted that the
decision of the principal case is sound on both the statutory and constitutional
issues. To hold otherwise on the statutory question would be to ascribe a contradiction to Congress in charging the commission with the duty of preventing
unlawful practices in commerce, while neglecting to provide a suitable method
for the agency to determine whether there has been continued compliance with
its orders. With respect to the constitutional question, it must be remembered
that the really fighting issue-the constitutionality of federal supervision over the
defendant's interstate business operations-has already been settled. Implicit in
the settlement of that issue was the notion that reasonable means of enforcement
would also receive constitutional sanction.11
Charles Myneder, S.Ed.
s Harriman v. ICC, supra note 6; FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., (D.C. Md. 1922) 284
F. 886; FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 336 (1924); Jones v.
SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 654 (1936). Also see Langeluttig, "Constitutional Limitations
on Administrative Power of Investigation," 28 ILL. L. REv. 508 (1933).
9 Woolley v. United States, (9th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 258 at 262; Consolidated
Mines v. SEC, (9th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 704 at 708; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, supra note 5 at 208-9. In Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 at 282, 39 S.Ct.
468 (1919), a grand jury is described as "a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or
forecasts of the probable result of the investigation. • • • [T]he identity of the offender, and
the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion
of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning."
10 Cf. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (7th Cir. 1-940) 114 F. (2d) 384, cert.
den. 311 U.S. 690, 61 S.Ct. 71 (1940), where the administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division was permitted to inspect records, which the Fair Labor Standards Act required to
be kept, in the absence of a showing of probable cause to suspect a violation of the act.
This transition in constitutional doctrine was facilitated by the Court's recognition that
corporations operating in interstate commerce are permitted to do so as a matter of Congressional grace, and, accordingly, are subject to federal supervision for much the same
reasons that states may oversee corporations which exist only by virtue of charter grants.
Hale v. Henkel, supra note 5 at 74-5; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 at 382, 31
S.Ct. 538 (1911).
11 A recent analysis of the trend toward broader administrative power to gather facts is
found in Davis, "The Administrative Power of Investigation," 56 YALE L.J. 1111 (1947).
Also see Handler, "The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission," 28 CoL. L. REv. 708 and 905 (1928).

